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Dirk Loerwald/Thomas Retzmann
Misselling as a New Topic of Financial Education? 
A Didactic Analysis of Investment Advice after the Financial Crisis
Personal financial investments are, as a matter of course, a topic of economic education because they are a 
life situation which is inherently economical. In contrast, faulty advising in banks which has become focussed 
upon due to the extent it has played a part in the recent financial crisis is mentioned neither in curricula nor in 
educational text books. Numerous private funds have been exposed as unprofitable investments. One reason 
for this problem is to be found in the marketing staff of the banks who did not invest their customer’s funds 
securely enough – and the customers did not notice it. What conclusions can be drawn from this for general 
financial education after the financial crisis?
The economic education has failed to address the topic of “faulty advising in banks” as well. On the basis of 
categorical economic didactics the following contribution will analyse whether one has an exemplary case here 
upon which students can win generalized, transferable insights. In this context, the topic of personal financial 
investments will be classified in an efficient manner and the risk of opportunism in advising situations will 
be analysed with the help of the positive principal-agent theory. The results of this analysis of informational 
asymmetries within financial markets give direction to the development and revision of curricula in the didac-
tics of economic education. With the following article a sustainable theoretical fundament will be created to 
underscore the obligatory inclusion of this topic in curricula as well as its realisation for target groups in school 
text books. 
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1.  General Financial Education 
after the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis unmasked a number of private fi-
nancial investments as unprofitable investments. One 
reason for this can be found in the fact that bank em-
ployees did not invest the money as securely as their 
customers would have desired – and the customers 
did not realize this. In contrast, the “aims and forms 
of personal financial investments” are found as a sub-
ject in nearly all curricula and school books which 
deal with this subject matter have relevant chapters 
accordingly. In addition, the pool of available educa-
tional materials from banks and savings banks is com-
prehensive. But a webquest at an extensive data bank 
for curricula (www.lehrplaene.org) yields only one hit 
for the topic “investment advice” and not a single hit 
for the topic “misselling”. Accordingly, this problem is 
also not discussed in school text books. It is also nei-
ther useful nor to be expected, that banks and savings 
banks develop educational materials. In light of this 
starting position it is up to the discretion of single 
teachers to decide whether students will be prepared 
for this economic situation or not. In the process the 
danger exists, that school instruction follows the ten-
or of public opinion and that it merely moralizes what 
actually should be analysed rationally.
On the basis of categorical economical didactics the 
authors will analyse in this contribution - for the first 
time - whether the problem of misselling in banks con-
cerning personal financial investments should assume 
an obligatory position in curricula and in school text 
books and which categories of economic thought can 
be conveyed to students with the help of this topic.
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In order to didactically legitimize the contents of 
some curricula, its societal and individual importance 
must initially be analysed. Therefore, the authors 
make an attempt in chapter two on the basis of a life 
situation-qualification approach to reconstruct per-
sonal financial investment and the usage of advisory 
services as an important, economically influenced 
life situation. Then it also has to be tested whether 
an analysis of the subject “misselling” even does 
belong in the domain of economics, since it is obvi-
ously also lastly an ethical problem. Therefore, it will 
be discussed in chapter 3 what type of fundamental 
domain specific contribution economic education can 
attempt to accomplish in clarifying the issues and the 
situational requirements. In light of scant lesson time 
and full curricula one also must account for the ex-
emplarity of the educational content, so that the stu-
dents can gain basic, essential, and structural insights. 
This occurs in chapter four in view of a situational 
analysis and in chapter five in regard to methods of 
problem solving.
Only when the three criteria (1) individual and so-
cietal significance, (2) original explicational contribu-
tion and (3) exemplarity are fulfilled can an educa-
tional topic said to be didactically valid to a sufficient 
degree. Only then can one demand that it be included 
in obligatory curricula plans, be prepared as a topic 
in school books for specific target groups of students 
and be made a central theme in school instruction 
(chapter six).
2.  Personal Investment as an 
Economic Life Situation
Economic education rests on three guiding principles: 
autonomy, competence and responsibility, meaning 
that it is supposed to support the ability to act ma-
turely, efficiently and responsibly in economic life 
situations.
The performance requirements of the situation are 
supposed to be reflected in subjective competencies 
to meet these requirements. General financial educa-
tion concentrates on life situations that are encoun-
tered by depositors, debtors and insurance policy 
holders. In economic education, the Life-Situation-
Concept (Steinmann 1997, 7) assigns the life situations 
„Saving/ Insuring/ Provision/ Asset formation“ to the 
area of life called „Application of Income“. This inves-
tigation focuses exclusively on the situation of the 
saver, wherein the life situations saving, investment 
and asset formation are not further distinguished for 
simplicity’s sake.
2.1  Social Developments and 
Asset Formation
Over the last decade, the necessity for long term asset 
formation has increased – not only for all members 
of the German society. This is caused by the demo-
graphic change that is marked by decreasing fertility 
rates and higher life expectancy. The falling number 
of premium payers and the growing group of pen-
sioners have led to arising financing problems within 
the statutory pension insurance. It has become com-
monly known, that the social security systems of the 
social state show substantial deficits, e.g. regarding 
the income of pensioners. According to the legislator, 
these deficits ought to be covered by personal retire-
ment provisions. The formation of assets is supposed 
to commence with entering the working force. The po-
litical decision to supplement the statutory pension 
system with a capital-funded model (e.g. the so-called 
“Riester-Rente” and “Rürup-Rente”) creates pressure on 
citizens to decide and act. Assuming they want to ac-
cumulate assets for retirement provision, they have to 
choose among the different investment products and 
their different suppliers. 
The life situation “investment” implies high re-
quirements from demanders, particularly consider-
ing the development on the supply side. At least for 
private investors, the market for financial products is 
intransparent: the globalisation of financial markets 
has led to strong growth in the number of suppliers. 
Via the internet, contracts can be signed equally easy 
with international as with domestic suppliers. Legal 
framework  - e.g. regarding deposit protection - differ 
depending on the company’s place of business. The 
deregulation of financial markets has engendered the 
evolution of completely new investment products. 
Overall, the number and variety of offered products 
has become unclear to a degree that complete aware-
ness of existing investment alternatives is unattain-
able for personal investors. These are furthermore 
often highly complex in their structure, preventing a 
reliable assessment of risk and opportunity. Rational 
and sound investment decisions require expert knowl-
edge. 
2.2 Asset Formation and Financial Literacy
Is the broad population suitably qualified to cope 
with the demands from the market for financial prod-
ucts and services? Doubts are raised by all empirical 
studies about Economic Literacy which have shown 
considerable lack of such among the population (e.g. 
Würth, Klein 2001). To an even greater extent, the 
same will apply for their Financial Literacy (cf. Reif-
ner 2006), which, however has not been subject to as 
much empirical research.
Financial education should enhance the ability to 
make investment decisions as independently, com-
petently and responsibly as possible. The individ-
ual is independent from advice to the extent of her 
economic competency. A problem that he can solve 
herself does not require an expert but at most some 
information about the supply side. Such information 
can be obtained either from the suppliers directly, or 
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from independent consumer protection institutions 
like Stiftung Warentest. Although this latter source of 
general consumer information increases transparency 
and hence improves decision making, it needs to be 
distinguished from customer advice that is tailored to 
the individual situation of the customer. 
In many cases, it is neither possible nor sensible to 
educate the demand side in all economic fields from 
laymen to experts. It is even a characterising element 
of the modern and functionally differentiated eco-
nomic world, which is marked by specialisation and 
division of labour, that not everyone can or needs to 
know everything. For efficiency reasons, the knowl-
edge required for personal investment is hence most-
ly not accumulated by each personal investor, but re-
quested from financial services companies in the form 
of “investment advice”. Most people will therefore 
sooner or later demand “investment advice” and gen-
eral financial education should consequently imply 
the preparation for the sales or counselling situation 
as well as develop competencies for decision making. 
3.  The Business-Ethical Dimension 
of Investment Advice 
The global economic and financial crisis which origi-
nated from the US housing market is publicly dis-
cussed as a crisis of capitalism itself. It is said to have 
become evident once again that capitalist economic 
systems do not develop smoothly but cyclically and 
encounter crises. The frequency of crises with global 
effects appears to have grown rapidly in the age of 
globalisation (e.g. Asia-Crisis, Russian Financial Crisis, 
Dotcom Crisis, Global Financial Crisis). Many people 
furthermore consider the current crisis – more than 
the afore mentioned ones – to be resulting from the 
ethical foundations of capitalism (or the lack thereof). 
Adam Smith’s invisible-hand-theory is questioned 
once again in light of the alleged market failure. On 
the one hand, performance-based compensation sys-
tems, specifically those of investment bankers, are dis-
cussed as having caused the crisis by stimulating their 
egoism towards insatiable greed, that was no longer 
controlled by ethical standards. On the other hand, 
the financial crisis has resulted in high destruction of 
wealth among personal investors, who, while unaware 
of the risks, apparently blindly followed the invest-
ment recommendations of sales associates. They feel 
deceived and betrayed due to the perceived abuse of 
their unawareness and trust. Others are said to have 
themselves been acting out of greed by ignoring or 
accepting all risk in the chase of a higher return. 
The ethical dimension of the problem is not to be 
underestimated. Does the topic actually belong in the 
scope of economic education? Greed and indulgence 
are accounted for in theology as vices which under-
line the presence of a bad character! Does the prob-
lem therefore rather give reason for character educa-
tion of bank employees and private investors? Should 
the debate about misselling in banks even be given 
over to economic education? In order to determine 
the domain specific contribution of economic educa-
tion in the clarification of ethical questions concern-
ing economic activity the following will attempt to 
summarize the economic ethical dimension of private 
investment advising. 
3.1 Misselling in Banks – a Latent Risk 
It is certainly rational not to make investment deci-
sions without approaching an expert for advice when 
lacking the required knowledge. It is also efficient if 
this knowledge is not acquired by each personal inves-
tor but by experts that can then share this knowledge 
repeatedly. But whenever a decision depends upon 
external advice, it bears the risk of being accidentally 
or even knowingly wrong advice from “experts”. This 
results from market intransparency which causes 
problems of qualification and of motivation among 
the sales associates in banks:
•	 	Qualification	Problems: Even professional “financial 
advisers” in banks lack complete awareness of the 
entire market and the specific know-how to evalu-
ate risks and opportunities of ever changing finan-
cial products. They therefore have to rely them-
selves on the judgment of other experts (e.g. rating 
agencies, analysts within their bank). Division of 
labour has progressed far in this sense. Thus, sales 
associates sell their clients products that have 
been recommended, suggested or imposed on 
them for sale by others, without necessarilly fully 
understanding their structure. Consequently, they 
cannot evaluate risk and return reliably themselves.
•	 	Motivation	 Problems: Financial advisers in banks 
can purposely take advantage of their clients’ un-
awareness to maximise their own utility instead 
of their clients’. This is possible, as banks usually 
do not separate “advisory” and “selling” activities. 
The advisers are sales associates at the same time, 
which is why “advice” is marked with quotation 
marks in this paper as long as it refers to invest-
ment advice in banks. Moreover, the paper will 
refer to the bank’s employees as sales associates 
rather than as advisers to illustrate that their job is 
primarily to sell rather than to give advice.
The danger of misselling is large when it comes to 
personal investment, because the institutional frame-
work within banks has established incentives that 
expose sales associates to a conflict of interest. First 
of all, their compensation is to some extent based 
on performance (at times 100%) meaning that it is in 
their best financial interest to achieve high sales. They 
additionally need to consider internal requirements of 
their institution. In the context of management by 
objectives, they are asked to attain certain quantita-
tive goals within a given time horizon wherein the 
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achievement of such goals is surveilled and failure to 
achieve them is sanctioned. There are guidelines for 
client contact that encourage the preferred treatment 
of financial products offered by the bank or fund-
managing subsidiaries. The interests of the client and 
the bank can not always be combined with that of the 
sales associate. This conflict of interest has led to a 
number of verifiable cases of misselling in the past. 
At times this involved intentional fraud as in the case 
of the former broker Bernard L. Madoff, who caused 
an estimated financial damage of 65 billion US-dollars 
to 4800 investors by using a pyramid scheme (“Ponzi-
Scheme”). He was sentenced to a prison term of 150 
years on 29th June 2009. 
In this paper, misselling will also refer to those 
cases in which the bad recommendations were not 
intentional but against the documented wishes and 
needs expressed by the client. They are less spectacu-
lar but have affected many personal investors. They 
are therefore more suitable for general financial edu-
cation, which serves the maturity of the consumer. 
The term “misselling” is supposed to – without 
judgment – describe a situation in which the recom-
mended investment differs from the explicit desire of 
the client or his real needs. The focus is neither on an 
actual financial damage to the client, nor on an advan-
tage for the sales associate or the bank or their inten-
tions. It is, for example a case of misselling, when a 
sales associate recommends a change of contract to 
a client, simply because he receives a commission 
while accepting a potentially worse situation for the 
client. Such cases are explicitly warned against (Finan-
ztest 2009, 37). However, it is still a case of misselling, 
even if the client does not incur financial damage or 
even benefits from the recommendation against his 
expressed desire or need. For instance, if a client had 
expressed a desire for safe investments but had never-
theless been sold shares in a stock-based mutual fund 
which the client had then disposed of with a high prof-
it during a bull market. He would not have sustained 
a financial loss, but he unintentionally had borne a 
financial risk and possibly remained unaware of its ex-
istence even in retrospect. Since, high return always 
comes with high risk, even a complete loss of the in-
vested capital may have been possible. It is, however, 
not a case of misselling, if a sales associate fails to 
disclose better or cheaper products of competitors. It 
would go too far to expect suppliers in a competitive 
market to inform clients about their competitors. 
3.2 The Ethics of People and Institutions
The public debate about the lax morality of “bankers“ 
(and institutional investors) follows the paradigm of 
individual ethics: the ultimate cause of a crisis is seen 
in a moral deficit of the acting individuals. It is none-
theless doubtfull to attempt to explain the failure of 
a system solely through individual failure. The ques-
tion is rather, how the system has created space for 
such individual failure or stimulated or sanctioned it. 
This discussion requires a reference to the paradigm of 
individual ethics. To simplify, the difference between 
the ethics of individuals and those of institutions lies 
within the distinction that the further investigates 
the players’ moral quality whereas the latter challeng-
es the moral quality of the “rules”. According to the 
approach by institutional ethics, morality can only 
subordinately be provided by individuals. It needs to 
be engendered primarily through the behavioural in-
fluence of institutions. Whenever moral misbehaviour 
derives from wrong incentives, the better approach is 
an incentive-compatible reconstruction of situatively 
relevant institutions. The advantage of institutional 
ethics is the systematic disattachment of the motives 
of acting individuals from the results of a social acting 
situation. The achievement of ethically desired results 
of action is then no longer dependent on individuals 
acting morally. Even in situations, where individual 
ethics are constrained by the inability or unwilling-
ness of individuals to act morally, institutional ethics 
can remain effective. According to Kant, even a popu-
lation of devils would create a state and abide by a 
social contract if only they were capable of reasoning. 
Institutions, however, cannot control individual be-
haviour directly, but can only stimulate it. And hence, 
institutional ethics can only work as a supplement 
but not as a perfect substitute for individual ethics. 
Moreover, such institutions do not just exist, but are 
created by people that may or may not be interested 
in fair “rules”. Individual ethics are thus a prerequi-
site for institutional ethics, which then aid to liberate 
individuals from ethical expectations in the choice of 
their action. 
3.3 Business-Ethics and Economic Education
The global financial crisis gives rise to the institution-
al-ethical reflection on, and potential reformation of 
the system of market economies as well as of the spe-
cific situation of investment “advice”. The question re-
mains, how this situation can be covered in teaching 
in order to result in economic and ethical education of 
students. Retzmann (2006, 274 et sqq.) has shown that 
there are four different perspectives within economic 
and business-ethical education, which are, however, 
not equally suitable for any subject of teaching. These 
perspectives are therefore firstly weighed up against 
each other: 
•	 	The	 acting person’s perspective: Students are re-
garded as potential personal investors that are to 
be qualified to cope with the demands of the asso-
ciated situation. This is the predominant perspec-
tive in general financial education. It is also mostly 
taken in vocational training, e.g. in the training of 
banking and insurance associates, who are trained 
to conduct counselling interviews.
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•	 	The	affected person’s perspective: In this case, stu-
dents are regarded as the counterparty of an act-
ing person, that takes the acting initiative. The 
affected person is involved in an interaction or a 
transaction with the acting person. In advisory or 
selling interaction with a bank, a personal investor 
is affected by investment and buying recommenda-
tions from sales associates. He is the counterparty 
of such an acting person. In the case of misselling, 
he is their “victim”. While this perspective is pre-
dominant in the media, it is treated subordinately 
in general financial education. 
It goes without saying that it cannot be the aim of 
professional training, to qualify banking and insur-
ance associates for misselling in the acting person’s 
perspective. Considering the current incentive sys-
tem in banks, the teacher’s moral appeal to act in the 
customer’s best interest would be ineffective. Neither 
should the teaching of economics focus exclusively on 
protecting the affected person from misselling, even 
though this is certainly legitimate. This perspective 
would lead to an admittedly appropriate scepticism 
against banking associates, but may also encourage 
an unwanted moralisation of the problem. 
•	 	The	acting	and	the	affected	person	are	involved	in	
a context of action that is perceived from the out-
side by the impartial spectator. The impartial specta-
tor can therefore relate both perspectives to each 
other and analyse the resulting context impartially. 
This spectator’s perspective is hitherto rarely taken 
in general financial education but is considered nec-
essary to cover the topic of “misselling in banks”. 
Ignoring the offender or victim’s perspective, the 
teaching of economics should aim to explain the 
phenomenon of misselling economically from the 
situation of the acting and the affected person.
•	 	Like	the	spectator,	the	citizen is not involved in the 
direct context of action. Unlike the spectator how-
ever, the citizen attempts to alter the action from 
the outside, as long as it leads to an ethically defi-
cient result. The citizen judges and intervenes when 
necessary. He does not achieve this by becoming 
part of the action, but through the construction of 
a political framework. This implies the implemen-
tation of ethical standards in economic action by 
institutions. A contribution to economic and busi-
ness-ethical education therefore also requires the 
citizen’s perspective. 
The following will evaluate, what theoretically reason-
able insight can be achieved by taking the spectator’s 
and the citizen’s perspective in “misselling in banks” 
as a topic of economic education. 
4.  Investment Advice as a Topic 
of Economic Education
Fundamentally, we have to distinguish between finan-
cial products (e.g. an investment) and financial services 
(e.g. investment advice in a bank). Using an economic 
analysis of the investment and the “counselling situ-
ation”, we can identify starting points for an institu-
tional approach to misselling in banks. 
4.1 Financial Products as Credence Goods
In a supermarket, offered rotten fruit will never be 
picked to go in the trolley. An electronic device that 
turns out to be defective immediately after purchase 
can be exchanged at the retailer. But what if a sales as-
sociate recommends a risky investment that does not 
meet the customer’s need for safety? This situation 
is different from the previous two, as the customer 
as a layman can usually neither assess the individual 
suitability or utility of a financial product before, nor 
after purchase. In economics, the trust issues associ-
ated with a good or service are referred to as informa-
tional asymmetries between supply and demand side. 
Depending on whether the asymmetries exist ex ante, 
ex post or in both cases, the qualities of a good or 
service are distinguished into search, experience and 
credence qualities. Search qualities are characterised 
by the buyer’s possibility to inspect the good reliably 
before purchase, which is why goods with large search 
quality elements are also referred to as “inspection 
goods” (Hirshleifer 1973, 37). The qualities of experi-
ence goods (first: Nelson 1970) cannot be assessed be-
fore but definitely after purchase or use.
Complex financial products barely possess any 
search qualities and only few experience qualities. 
Personal investors usually lack the knowledge re-
quired to evaluate the quality of an investment reli-
ably ex ante. Experience also only provides limited 
evaluation of a financial product, since a low return 
can also be traced back to other factors (e.g. an eco-
nomic downturn). Even good past experience – unlike 
for regularly purchased goods of standardised quality 
– does not serve as an indicator for the future. Only 
exceptional circumstances like the current financial 
crisis turn financial products into experience goods. 
Many personal investors that were assuming to have 
invested their money safely had to acknowledge the 
presence of risky products in their portfolios, that lost 
all or part of their value as the crisis progressed. Their 
presence would never have been discovered without 
the financial crisis.
Financial products contain large elements of cre-
dence goods (first: Darby, Karni 1973). This means that 
certain qualities of the product cannot be perceived 
at all, or only when incurring prohibitively high costs. 
Informational asymmetries between supply and de-
mand sides exist in markets for credence goods (cf. 
Reisch 2005, 186). 
As a consequence of the large share of credence 
qualities in financial products, trust is an important 
basis for a functioning market. Trust can be defined 
economically as an exploitable investment by the trus-
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tor: „A pervasive notion in the literature is that trust 
is associated with dependence and risk: the trustor de-
pends on something or someone (the trustee or object 
of trust), and there is a possibility that expectations 
or hopes will not be satisfied, and that ‘things will go 
wrong’. Trust entails the submission to relational risk. 
Yet one expects that ‘things will go allright’“ (Noot-
eboom 2005, 37). The central problem of markets for 
credence goods is therefore, the presence of incentives 
for the trustee to exploit the invested trust.
4.2  Investment “Advice” as a 
Principal-Agent Relationship 
Since financial products contain a large share of cre-
dence qualities, banks have employees with expert 
knowledge to make the intransparent market for fi-
nancial products more transparent for personal inves-
tors. Does this solve the personal investor’s problem? 
Unfortunately not! The problem at present is that the 
sales associate does not just have to consider the cus-
tomer’s interest but also that of his employer and will 
potentially even take his own interest into account.
Clients, sales associates and banks probably do not 
only pursue mutual but also conflicting interests. As 
soon as the interests of the client (e.g. the safest in-
vestment), the sales associate (e.g. the highest com-
mission) and the bank (e.g. highest sales) are not con-
gruent, the client is in danger of being advised against 
his own interest. In other words, the danger of missel-
ling arises. 
This danger can be evaluated in class using the 
principal-agent theory, as it investigates contractual 
relationships between a principal and an agent. It 
occasionally depends on the situation to determine 
who the principal and the agent are. Furthermore, one 
person can simultaneously be agent to several people.
Principal-agent problems arise from an asymmetric 
distribution of information between principal and 
agent. The agent has an advantage in knowledge re-
garding the conduct of the task, which is, amongst 
other things, the reason why the principal does not 
conduct the task himself. The agent can use this ad-
vantage in the interest of the principal (advantages of 
local knowledge) or in his own (danger of opportunist 
action). If the agent evaluates existing alternative ac-
tions considering an own interest that conflicts with 
the principal’s interest informational asymmetries 
can compromise the mutual benefit of a cooperation. 
The counselling interaction between sales associate 
and customer in a bank is a principal-agent relation-
ship: Customers ask the sales associates of a bank to 
compose a portfolio of investments that suits the in-
dividual preferences and life situation. As principal, 
they are trustors at the same time. By providing trust 
towards the agent, they immediately bear a risk. They 
expect their trust not to be disappointed but accept 
the risk of precisely that. 
4.3  Misselling as a Result of 
Conflicts of Interest
Customer advisers also act on account of the bank’s 
management, which has asked them to make profit-
able transactions for the bank. Situations of financial 
advice therefore possess the special quality that a 
sales associate – as an agent – serves two principals: 
the customers and the management. In addition to 
the conflicting interests of agent and principal, the 
agent needs to weight the interests of both principals. 
Personal investment is therefore a complex structure 
of relationships between a principal (the bank), an 
agent (the sales associate) and another principal (the 
customer). It is consequently an example of a princi-
pal-agent-client relationship. 
Assuming all people involved act rationally, the 
sales associate’s primary interest is to increase his 
income through commissions and premiums and to 
establish himself within the firm. The bank has an 
interest in the highest possible number of revenue 
generating customers. The customer’s interest is – de-
pending on individual preferences – a safe, accessible 
or high yielding investment. This demonstrates how, 
alongside the mutual interest in a transaction which 
creates a win-win-situation, conflicting interests be-
tween the acting individuals involved exist in the spe-
cific structure of the transaction.
The typical principal-agent problems between em-
ployer and employee occur in the interaction between 
the bank’s management and its employees (hidden ac-
tion/ hidden characteristics). These informational prob-
lems arise from the limited insight into the agent’s 
freedom of action and from the difficulty to draw an 
immediate conclusion about the agent’s performance 
based on the results of the action. Effort and misfor-
tune can result in the same outcome as a combination 
of lazyness and luck. In the interaction between cus-
tomer and sales associate, the informational asymme-
tries result from the customer’s lack of know-how and 
the uncertainty about the agent’s true intentions (hid-
den information/ hidden intention). 
The bank as an employer solves its principal-agent 
problem – amongst other things – by implementing 
a performance-based compensation system. Bonuses, 
commissions and performance premiums are used to 
link the bank’s interest with that of the employee. The 
work towards a collective goal is more likely, the more 
it benefits the individual. The more an employee’s 
compensation depends upon performance indica-
tors, the lower will be the fixed component of the 
salary and the higher the employee’s probability to 
adjust his actions accordingly and potentially ignore 
customers’ interests. The problem of this complex 
principal-agent-client relationship lies in the fact, that 
the measures to mitigate informational problems be-
tween employer and employee enhance the conflict of 
interest between the employee and the customer. The 
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bank solves its principal-agent problem by increasing 
a different one. This can then not be in the bank’s best 
interest, as only satisfied customers will become regu-
lar ones, who will provide lasting opportunities for 
(profitable) transactions. The situation hence requires 
the right balance in meeting the conflicting interests. 
Interests
of the bank
Prinipals-
Level
Agent-
Level
Interests
of the clients
Interests
of the sales
associates
Fig. 1: Conflict of interests
To solve or alleviate the relevant problem of missel-
ling, principal-agent problems between sales associ-
ates and clients need to be mitigated. This requires 
on one hand more transparency in financial markets 
in order to give consumers access to their sanctioning 
potential (voice/exit). On the other hand, incentives 
need to be established on an institutional level to 
combine the interests of sales associates with those 
of their customers. This can be achieved through both 
legal requirements for protection of personal inves-
tors as well as through internal requirements for client 
contact in banks.
5.  Approaches Regarding the Acting 
Person and Regulation as a topic 
of Economic Education
To mitigate informational problems, regulative ap-
proaches can be distinguished from those based on 
the acting person. The latter can then again be divid-
ed into measures to signal information („signalling“; 
first: Spence 1973) and those to screen information 
(„screening“; first: Stiglitz 1974). 
5.1 Signalling Trustability
Signalling activities are measures to alleviate informa-
tional asymmetries that are initiated by the better in-
formed party. The qualities of an offered good or ser-
vice are to be communicated to the consumer through 
credible signals. The special challenge encountered by 
suppliers of financial products and services is the de-
velopment of trust in an area of goods with large cre-
dence quality elements. A supplier can send credible 
signals particularly well, if the investment of trust is 
reassured institutionally.
The trust in people can be supported by the trust 
in an institution. Institutions can alleviate the dan-
ger of exploitation that trustors are exposed to, if the 
incentives that originate from them act to make an 
exploiting behaviour less attractive for the trustee. 
Institutions can take a complementary and substitu-
tive function for trust (Kubon-Gilke 2005, 10 et sqq.). 
In an interaction, trust serves the purpose of dimin-
ishing uncertainties about the counterparty’s behav-
iour. Trust is a mechanism for the reduction of social 
complexity (Luhmann 1989). Institutions have a simi-
lar function, as they can reduce uncertainties through 
regularity (cf. Krohn 2007, 16). They can structure in-
teractions, stabilise expectations and create an envi-
ronment of trust.
An intelligent and incentive-compatible design of 
institutions can guarantee the effect of social control 
and hence the trust-creating protection from exploita-
tion even in an anonymous and complex context of in-
teractions. Behaviour that conflicts with norms can be 
sanctioned and desired behaviour rewarded through 
the effect of control and incentives by institutions. 
Institutions structure the individual’s freedom of ac-
tion and thus channel human behaviour according to 
the situation; they also – which is a central point in 
this context – stabilise behavioural expectations (cf. 
Beckmann 2005, 66). 
Suppliers on the market for financial products and 
services can therefore establish a culture of trust 
through the creation and design of institutions. Cus-
tomers’ trust in the quality of financial “advice” and 
products has sustained severe damage in the context 
of the financial crisis. To regain customers’ trust, it 
seems helpful for the suppliers to send institutionally 
reassured and therefore trustworthy signals of reputa-
tion. For example: the Quirin Bank promotes itself as 
advising without the presence of commissions. It has 
established the internet platform www.provisions-
verbot.de and organised a petition against commis-
sions in the banking sector to the German Bundestag. 
Regardless of whether the Quirin Bank gives “advice” 
that is superior to that given by other banks, this dem-
onstrates the importance the bank assigns to this “sig-
nal of trust”. 
5.2 Testing Trustability
Screening summarises the principal’s possibilities to 
mitigate the asymmetric distribution of information 
through an information search. In the given context, 
screening activities from the demand side can relate 
to financial products on one hand. Customers can col-
lect information about different products and their 
advantages and disadvantages to reduce the sales as-
sociate’s advantage in knowledge. An informed cus-
tomer is more likely to notice “advice” that is not in 
his best interest and only aims for the sales associate’s 
commission. On the other hand, screening activities 
can be directed at financial services, when the princi-
pal tries to form a more informed opinion about po-
tential agents. This can reduce the danger of a bad 
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agent selection. Screening activities can only be effec-
tive on the market for financial products, if reliable in-
formation about the quality of financial products and 
services is made more accessible to customers. Cred-
ible external institutions with an adequate expertise 
need to compose information in such a way to enable 
demanders to better screen the complex and intrans-
parent market for financial products and services. For 
example: the magazine Finanztest publishes a warning 
list of all offers that are advertised or sold with dubi-
ous methods or that show a clear disproportion of risk 
and opportunities. This list names offers, initiators, 
sales agents, suppliers and other involved parties.  
5.3 Increase Transparency and Liability
Informational problems cannot only be mitigated 
by strengthening the incentives for information ac-
tivities of the acting people that are directly affected, 
but also through regulatory measures. A state essen-
tially has two possibilities to reduce informational 
asymmetries: it can create additional transparency by 
providing the required information, or it can directly 
alleviate informational problems by, for instance, in-
fluencing the production process by setting standards 
(cf. Benner 2002, 30 et sqq.). 
To give an example: the probably most prominent 
example of statutory provision of information in an 
economic context in Germany is Stiftung Warentest, 
which tests products and services employing scientif-
ic methods by independent institutions and publishes 
the results. Stiftung Warentest is not a statutory insti-
tution but an independent foundation, vested with 
legal capacity. It was however, created in the early 
1960s upon statutory initiative. The special necessity 
for consumer information about financial issues is 
demonstrated by the publication of a differentiated 
magazine Finanztest by Stiftung Warentest, which in-
forms the readership about investment tools, insur-
ance, taxes, provision etc. The magazine uses tests 
to inform about the quality of financial products and 
services. Media analyses by the magazine Finanztest 
have shown that the readership is primarily composed 
of well-educated academics that are able to assimilate 
the intellectually demanding information offered.
The role of statutory influence on the market for 
financial products and services has recently become 
evident in the alteration of the law for dealing with 
financial securities: Since 2010, banks are obligated 
to prepare a written and signed documentation of 
the content of every counselling interview. This is 
supposed to facilitate the legal enforcement of com-
pensation for any damage to demanders caused by 
misselling. Another example for statutory interven-
tion in financial markets is the recent verdict by the 
Bundesgerichtshof (Az. XI ZR 586/07), which obliges 
banks to disclose any commissions during counsel-
ling interviews. For the personal investor, this does 
not only make the agent’s interest evident but even 
quantifiable. 
6.  Financial Competency as a Goal 
of Economic Education 
It has been justified many times by different groups 
(didacts, educational scientists, social interest groups) 
that all adolescents have a right to be offered a sys-
tematic general financial education (incorporated in 
their economic education at school), for them to be 
able to succeed – from an economic perspective – in 
leading their lives (cf. e.g.  Kaminski 2005; Piorkowsky 
2009). This paper shall not repeat but simply state this 
argument. There are possibilities for informal learn-
ing even within financial or economic education, e.g. 
from experience. To rely on only that, however, is not 
only insufficient but even desastrous, particularly in 
the case of financial education. The reference to in-
formal learning implies that people are supposed to 
learn and become smarter from experience. Whoever 
argues like this accepts that people make mistakes 
and learn from them. In the case of personal invest-
ment, however, such mistakes can have severe conse-
quences. Apart from that, learning from experience 
is only possible in the case of goods with experience 
qualities. It does not apply to credence goods. It is 
therefore strongly inadvisable to rely on informal 
learning alone. On the contrary, general financial edu-
cation within schools should be enhanced systemati-
cally and its goal must be a well-developed Financial 
Literacy for all adolescents. It is likely, that individuals 
educated in economics can benefit from opportuni-
ties and avoid risks better than economic laymen. 
Stronger financial competency within the popula-
tion is publicly requested by a variety of acting indi-
viduals. For instance, the ministry for alimentation 
and consumer protection has argued in favour of the 
pursuit of a stronger financial competency among 
consumers during the latest quality assurance for the 
quality of financial advice and the qualification of 
sales associates (cf. BMELV 2009). But what do we actu-
ally mean by financial competency? And why should 
it be part of an economic education aiming at gen-
eral education? These questions cannot be fully an-
swered here, but the present contribution has shown, 
that financial competence must go beyond simple 
help and provide categorical comprehension which is 
then transferable. Economic education must also not 
be confined to mediating knowledge about different 
investment types and financial services, but it has to 
contain structural and functional economic knowl-
edge about the investment or counselling situation. 
Students can recognise and comprehend the struc-
tural dimension of different economic life situations 
on the basis of a theoretical understanding of eco-
nomics. Economic education is not only relevant to 
the subject area of economics, but also to its specific 
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scientific methodology. In the context of a discussion 
in school about situations of financial “advice”, this 
implies that the consideration of finance-linked top-
ics (e.g. money, interest) is insufficient. Students need 
to understand the structural causes of the problem. 
Only then are they able to transfer their knowledge 
to the approach of new problem sets. They need to be 
able to direct their economic perspective at a certain 
problem. Economic education can, for epistemologi-
cal reasons, only be defined through the perspective 
of gaining understanding. Accepting this, the curricu-
lum has to be marked by the selection of theoretical 
approaches and not primarily through the selection 
of covered subjects.
The number of economic life situations is unidentifi-
able, since no situation is ever truly identical to anoth-
er one in every single aspect. It would be impossible 
to prepare students for dealing with economic life sit-
uations successfully, if any economically relevant life 
situation had to be qualified separately. To facilitate a 
successful dealing with “counselling situations” from 
the personal investor’s point of view, the focus needs 
to be on the structural problem which reappears in 
a specified form in many situations (not only in per-
sonal investment). It cannot be the aim of teaching 
to turn students into quasi investment experts. This 
would not only require an unreasonable amount of 
time, but would also not be efficient, considering the 
rapid development and change of the institutional de-
tails of the market for financial products and services.
The positive principal-agent theory seems suitable 
to uncover the structural problem of “counselling situ-
ations” in banks. The analysis of the investment situa-
tion on the basis of the principal-agent approach has 
demonstrated that cases of misselling in banks have 
not been unfortunate accidents in the context of the 
global financial crisis. They originated from structural 
problems and have been emphasised by the exist-
ing incentive systems. The financial crisis has merely 
made the degree of misselling evident through the 
cases of investors losing all their invested capital. 
The principal-agent theory can serve as a heuristic 
in the analysis of principal-agent relationships and 
not (!) as a tool in the search for optimal incentive 
contracts. 
The principal-agent theory can serve as a heuristic 
in the analysis of principal-agent relationships and 
not (!) as a tool in the search for optimal incentive 
contracts. Heuristics are not confined to certain sub-
jects but can be employed according to the problem. 
Goods with credence qualities are not only present 
in money and capital markets and contract relations 
are virtually ubiquitous in the economic sphere based 
on the division of labor. Rehearsed on the example of 
personal investment and counselling students can ap-
ply these economical thought schemes independently 
to other life situations dependant on economics. The 
life situation approach and the categorical approach 
in the didactics of economics (Kruber 2000) do not 
contradict one another, but rather complement each 
other meaningfully – even in economic education.
The principal-agent analysis of „counselling situa-
tions“ in banks has shown: conflicts of interest arise as 
soon as the investment advice is not strictly separat-
ed from the selling activity. This can occur in more or 
less well defined forms. We can therefore expect the 
continued occurrence of misselling in the future. As 
a consequence, it is not surprising that independent 
service tests by Stiftung Warentest will – as others pre-
viously – fail to cause a behavioural change among 
sales associates in banks. They still recommend fi-
nancial products that object the investors’ expressed 
goals and preferences (Finanztest 2010).
7. Conclusion
Investment situations are prospectively relevant life 
situations for students, which cannot be dealt with on 
the basis of day-to-day experience alone. They should 
hence become part of the curricula when teaching 
economics. Due to the complexity of the market for 
financial products and services and the efficiency ad-
vantages of today’s division of labour, it should not 
be the aim of teaching to pass on detailed product-
specific and institutional knowledge. Product knowl-
edge would be out-dated all too fast by reality when 
mediated in the context of a financial „product train-
ing“. In contrast, structure and functional knowledge 
remains constant over time. But because the study of 
basic economic thought processes is possible with the 
help of the topic „misselling“, it can be said to have ex-
emplary qualities. It is equally unreasonable to limit 
the preparation for investment situations to simple 
instrumental aid. Whatever may suffice for simple 
economic life situations in banks (such as opening an 
account or transferring money) does not satisfy the 
demands of a more complex investment situation 
which requires a solid understanding of the economic 
processes involved. The empirically observable phe-
nomenon of misselling by sales associates enforces an 
extraordinary dimension upon the problem of the life 
situation “Investment”. 
The results of the present situation analysis can 
initially be elaborated in a way that is adequate to 
the target group, and then become a fundamental 
part of the economic and political education of stu-
dents. This has to focus on retrospectively highlight-
ing which “rules” of the market or the firm encourage 
misselling and what kind of regulation for the protec-
tion of personal investors from misselling has prov-
en to be deficient or counterproductive in the past. 
In the future the most suitable regulation to avoid 
misselling needs to be elaborated. This procedure 
guarantees that the discussion about economic and 
political systemic control will be based on economic 
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knowledge of the systemic logic. It avoids the mere 
moralisation of the misbehaviour of others, since 
complaining about the status quo does not contrib-
ute to its improvement. The approaches to solve the 
problem need to relate to the level of acting individu-
als (a bank’s management, employee and customer) 
but also to that of the institutional framework of 
the market for financial products and services. Using 
the example of an institutional-economic discussion 
about investment situations and misselling, students 
can learn and evaluate institutional approaches to 
the support of morality. 
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